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Abstract
The West Liberty Foods turkey cooperative was formed in 1996 to purchase the assets
and assume operations of Louis Rich Foods (an investor-owned processing rm), which, at
the time, announced the imminent shutdown of its West Liberty, Iowa, processing facility.
We study the creation and performance of this new generation cooperative using eld
interviews with grower members and company management. We describe changes, before
and after the buyout, in the contractual apparatus used for procuring live turkeys, and in
the communication requirements, work expectations, and nancial positions of growers.
During the private ownership period, most of the inputs (except labor and facilities) were
provided by the rm; there was substantial supervision of the growers’ actions; growers
faced little price and production risk; and growers’ equity was due largely to ownership of
land and other farm assets. Our interviews reveal that, after cooperative formation,
growers were exposed to considerable additional risk; monitoring of growers by the rm
was less intensive; grower time and effort commitments to turkey production increased
substantially; and a signicant fraction of rm (cooperative) equity came from growers’
willingness to leverage their farm and personal assets (and hence indirectly their existing
relationships with local lenders). We argue that some of these changes are consistent with
a nancial contract where asset pledging and its corollary risk generate higher work effort
by growers and a reduction in agency rents. These economies likely compensate for an
organizational deadweight loss traditionally associated with cooperative governance.
Keywords: Cooperatives, procurement, nancial contracting, agriculture
COOPERATIVES AND CONTRACTING IN AGRICULTURE: THE CASE
OF WEST LIBERTY FOODS
Introduction
The last two decades have witnessed the emergence of a mode for agricultural
cooperation that appears, from an organizational standpoint, to be a departure from the
tradition of cooperatives with open membership and a small up-front nancial
commitment. So-called new-generation cooperatives (NGCs) have a dened (or closed)
membership, require signicant up-front equity from joining members, have transferable
and appreciable equity shares, and are structured with voting rights that are proportional to
members’ delivery obligations. Economists and other cooperative scholars have
investigated the characteristics of NGCs and argue that they represent an organizational
innovation that improves long-run investment incentives (e.g., Cook and Illiopoulos, 1999;
Harris et al., 1996).
The rise of NGCs, and their apparent popularity with growers, is intriguing because it
raises questions concerning their economic role, relative to investor-owned rms. As
noted by Cook and Chaddad (2004), most of these grower cooperatives are engaged in
processing and have either replaced an exiting investor-owned rm (IOF) or have initiated
processing operations in niche markets. Why are these cooperatives able to operate
when private investors are not? More generally, what are the relative advantages and
disadvantages of the NGC organizational structure?
The objective of the present work is to suggest potential answers to these questions in
the context of a particular example: West Liberty Foods (WLF) of Iowa. This cooperative,
which is owned by Iowa turkey growers, replaced a privately owned company in 1996 and
has been operating successfully since that time. The special interest we have in this case
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comes from the fact that it contrasts the logic of two organizational modescooperative
and privateone replacing the other. As we describe in more detail in the next section,
most existing research on the nature of the NGC structure contrasts this cooperative
organizational mode with other cooperative structures. While useful as a means of
documenting the nature of organizational innovation across time, this form of comparison
is not helpful in contrasting the relative merit of cooperative and investor-owned
structures. We describe changes, before and after the buyout, in the contractual apparatus
used for procuring live turkeys, in the nancial position of growers, and in the
communication and work expectations of growers. From these observations, we try to
infer potential sources of relative advantage for the cooperative structure.
Briey, our analysis reveals that the conversion of the IOF to a cooperative resulted in
three broad changes. First, farmer members pledged many of their farm and personal
assets to participate in the cooperative. Second, the production contract with growers
became more highly powered: contracted growers now faced greater price and production
risk and stood the risk of losing a substantial portion of their personal wealth in the event
the rm failed. Moreover, our interviews reveal that growers capitalized on their
information regarding production possibilities to optimize the form of the production
contract used within the cooperative. Third, growers assumed responsibility for turkey
production activities that were once provided by the rm, and substantially increased their
involvement in turkey processing operations.1 We argue that some of these changes can be
understood in the context of a nancial contracting model where asset pledging and the
assumption of risk generate higher work effort by growers and a reduction in agency
rentsand that these changes likely compensate for an organizational deadweight loss
associated with cooperative governance.
Before turning to a description of WLF, we briey discuss other research on
cooperation in agriculture. This will help clarify the similarities and differences between
our study and other studies on the determinants of success in cooperative undertakings.
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Given the descriptive nature of our data, we do not test any formal hypotheses or propose
denitive answers to the questions noted above. Our more modest goal is to suggest,
based on observations from this example (and from other published research), various
hypotheses that might be formally tested in future work and to provide some guidance for
how this can be carried out.
Related Literature
The cooperative as a basic vertical integration process and the role of incentives
and information asymmetries
The formation of a processing cooperative is an example of a vertical integration
process. The economic literature has identied several aspects that limits vertical
integration through cooperative undertakings. The necessity to maintain assets can create
difculty when these assets are jointly owned and when the number of members becomes
important. Free-riding behavior among members and lack of monitoring can become
accute when the production team is quite large. Thus, it may be optimal to replace joint
ownership with a single private investor who intensely monitors workers (Dow, 2003).
Another set of limitations affecting cooperative undertakings is the existence of moral
hazard coupled with limited access to capital. Indeed, once a loan has been obtained by
cooperative members, there is often a certain amount of leeway as to how to spend this
money; in this setting moral hazard arises naturally, as members can easily substitute
loans for production and saving effort.2 As a result, the cost of capital is likely to be
higher for cooperative undertakings and this may explain why they are seldom observed
(Bonin et al., 1993). Similarly, it is argued that cooperative members are reluctant to
invest major fractions of their wealth in a cooperative project because of the risk they
incur by doing so (Pencavel, 2001). Major equity requirements and important risk taking
underlies the present cooperative case study, where we show that members had to
collaterize most of their assets to borrow the necessary equity.
In the traditional transaction-cost literature, the organization of production that
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emerges is one that minimizes transaction costs. Thus, in this view, the emergence of
vertical integration, or some form of exclusive dealings, arises when it can efciently
replace market-intermediated activities. When one contrasts these two ways of organizing
transactions, several characteristics are noticeable. First, when transactions are organized
through markets, agents’ incentives to produce efciently tend to be more powerful than
when transactions are operated within a single integrated entity. Second, information tends
to ow more freely within than across organizations. This apparent trade-off between the
power of incentives and the impact of information asymmetry is well recognized in the
organization theory literature. Williamson (1975) discusses the costs of information
collection and the impacts of moral hazard when it comes to vertical integration. He
argues that integration is likely to result in smaller costs of information collection (p. 86).
As argued by Hansmann (1996), cooperatives constitute organizational entities that can
credibly compete or substitute for investor-owned rms in specic circumstances.
New generation cooperatives in agriculture
The rise of the NGC has been essentially within the realm of the food processing
sector and it is associated with a decline in growers’ net income (Torgerson, 2001). Most
of the NGCs created recently were created ex nihilo or replaced IOFs that were planning
to exit.3 Related to this latter point, Hueth and Marcoul (2005) argue that a cooperative
organization with strictly positive up-front equity can emerge as a unique equilibrium
organizational structure, even though it generates less surplus than an IOF. This is possible
because in the cooperative organization, initial investments are funded and guaranteed by
growers and this leads to a reduction in agency rents. However, such an organization
emerges only when the joint returns to farming and processing are small and insufcient
to cover both the investment costs of processing and the agency rent earned by growers. In
such a model, the cooperative organization represents a device to reduce the agency rent
enjoyed by growers.
A growing economic literature is developing on NGCs. Harris et al. (1996) describe
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the organizational features of such organizations and contrast them with traditional
cooperatives. Cook and Illiopoulos (1999) also study the emergence of NGCs. They argue
that there was a cooperative fever in the beginning of the 1990s and that more than 80%
of cooperative formations in the Upper Midwest during this period were non-traditional.
Cook and Chaddad (2004) and Chaddad and Cook (2004) develop a typology of
agricultural cooperatives based on property rights. They argue in particular that unlike
traditional cooperatives, NGCs enhance members’ incentives to invest by allowing
members to have transferable and appreciable residual claims.
Besides theoretical contributions, a growing number of case studies of NGCs have
attempted to describe the features of NGCs and other cooperatives. Zueli et al. (2001)
study the formation of the Dakota Growers Pasta Company, an NGC of durum growers
established in 1998. The authors generally focus on the impact of this NGC on the local
community and argue that it was benecial overall. Carlberg et al. (2004) carry out
surveys concerning the success of NGCs. The results of their study echo our ndings
regarding the importance of the initial capitalization and member involvement. Most of
the cooperative boards that are surveyed ranked these aspects as highly important for the
success of the cooperative. Our contribution to this strand of the literature is to contrast
NGC operations with the IOF counterpart.
Cooperatives and the organization of production
Several other case studies have analyzed organizational factors important for
explaining the management of contractual relationships with members. This research is
related to ours in that it provides further evidence that the cooperative nancial structure
leads to different contract arrangements, relative to what would be observed in an
investor-owned organization; it also provides further conrmation that cooperatives are
viable in economic environments that cannot support investor-owned rms.
Guinnane (2001) uses business records of German credit cooperatives during the
period 1883-1914 to study the determinants of their importance in rural German areas.
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Credit cooperatives used money deposited by members and non-members to extend loans
to members. Guinnane’s work shows that those institutions have prevailed essentially
because of their ability to obtain superior information on potential loan applicants and to
impose sanctions on defaulting members. Several characteristics explain that this was
indeed possible. First, rural cooperatives were operating on a very limited but exclusive
geographical and population scale, where reputational concerns of members were
paramount. To stimulate peer pressures among their members, the typical cooperative
relied on co-signers; thus, sanctions for non-repayment usually took the form of
irreversible damages to the borrower’s and cosigner’s reputations.4 Moreover, the
exclusive territories reinforced incentives for repayment by ensuring that a
borrower-member who defaulted would not be able to borrow again. Finally, these
cooperatives usually had unlimited-liability structures. This feature implied that
non-borrowing members were generally at risk if unwise loans were extended. Guinnane
argues that this feature was crucial in order to guarantee the credit cooperative a reliable
and costless source of information.
Whereas German credit cooperatives relied on intangible concepts such as social
capital and reputational concerns of borrowers to achieve repayment, Henriksen and
Hviid (2004) develop the idea that laws favorable to long-term contracting may be an
essential ingredient for the prevalence of cooperatives. They study dairy cooperative
formations and operations in Denmark before World War I. They argue that the success of
these undertakings essentially hinged on their ability to obtain a steady supply of milk for
long periods. Using the minutes of the board of these cooperatives, they show that dairy
cooperatives were able to achieve this goal by writing and enforcing long-term contracts
that prevented the exit of members. It appears that the Danish legal system, which
systematically enforced these contracts, was instrumental in the cooperatives’. They also
give several hints as to why private investors were not successful in the dairy business,
although the same contracting tools were readily available to them. In particular, they
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stress the importance of milk adulteration testing5 and argue that growers could not easily
trust a private investor to objectively test milk quality. This represents another example in
which the cooperative ownership structure leads to a different type of contractual
arrangement with members.
We now turn to a description of the formation of the West Liberty Food growers’
cooperative.
Description and Analysis of West Liberty Foods
Turkey production contracts before and after the formation of the West Liberty
Food Cooperative
Producing turkeys: From one-day-old turkeys to sliced luncheon meat. It takes
approximately 20 weeks to obtain a young adult turkey ready for slaughter. This process
is usually carried out in specialized facilities where growers start to feed turkeys when
they are one or two days old. Turkeys are fragile and their growth is constantly monitored
to optimize feed-to-meat conversion ratios.
Besides specialized facilities and labor, other essential inputs to growing turkeys are
the feed, litter, and liquid propane. The composition of turkey feed is a mix that evolves
over the production process. It is mainly composed of corn, soybeans, and a cocktail of
vitamins and minerals necessary for bird growth. The turkeys are raised on a oor covered
with litter that absorbs turkey excrement; the litter is removed periodically and used as
fertilizer in crop production. This litter thus represents a small but valuable by-product of
turkey growing. Finally, liquid propane is used to dry feed and heat the facility. When the
facility is too cold, the birds burn calories to generate warmth, and this reduces the rate of
weight gain.
When turkeys arrive at maturity, the birds are slaughtered and processed promptly. A
crucial aspect of processing (not unique to turkey production) is the importance of having
a constant supply of turkey at the plant. The plant has high xed costs and can incur huge
losses if supply drops or is not constant over time. As we will show, this aspect is
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important in understanding the form of the production contracts that are implemented
under the two different ownership structures, before and after the creation of the
cooperative.
Structure of procurement contracts and bird ownership before 1996. Before the
formation of the WLF cooperative, the West Liberty plant was operated by Louis Rich, a
subsidiary of Kraft Food Corporation. Louis Rich relied on two different ways of
procuring turkeys, as it faced two relatively distinct populations of growers: one from the
southeastern region and the other from the central region of Iowa.
In the central region of Iowa, contracts were structured to allow for heavy
involvement of Louis Rich in growers’ operations. Louis Rich contracted for purchase of
young turkeys from a third party and arranged for delivery to growers. These turkeys
remained the property of Louis Rich through the entire growing and harvesting period.
Aside from the facility itself, the growers’ only responsibility was to care for the turkeys;
other signicant inputs like food, litter, and veterinary services were provided by Louis
Rich. The contract usually took the form of a take-it-or-leave-it offer to growers, with a
at fee paid at delivery for each turkey, and a bonus/penalty provision contingent on
feed-conversion ratios and bird mortality.6 In southeastern Iowa, Louis Rich was far less
involved in growers’ operations. The number of birds and the unit price were specied,
and growers were then in charge of the entire growing process, including acquisition and
management of the production inputs. In both regions, contract conditions were uniform
across growers.
Central Iowa growers faced much less risk than growers in the southeast. Most
importantly, central growers were completely insulated against price variation in the cost
of feed. Although the litter was provided by Louis Rich, growers were subject to an
allowance in relation to the number of birds they received. This restriction seems to be
explained by the potential for moral hazard in the use of litter, which, as emphasized
earlier, generates valuable fertilizer. The central Iowa contract also seems to have been
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less demanding, in that the work effort required to source feed and veterinary services in
the southeast involved signicant extra cost.
There are two differences in the characteristics of growers across these regions that
may help explain the different types of contracts that were used. First, growers in the
southeast operate at a much smaller scale and are more diversied. This latter fact may
lower the cost of risk bearing, and thus lower the cost of using the lighter contractual
apparatus observed in the southeast. Similarly, growers in the southeast mostly come from
a community of Mennonites and there is anecdotal evidence of informal group risk
sharing in these communities.
In the next section, we begin our description of changes that occurredin nancial
position of growers and in the contractual apparatus for turkey procurementas a result
of cooperative formation.
Cooperative formation: “Pledging the farm”
In mid-1996 Louis, Rich ofcially announced to its contract producers that it would
stop turkey processing at the end of the year and close the West Liberty plant. At that
point, the market for turkey meat was depressed, and eventually Kraft Food decided to
withdraw from the processing business. After some initial uncertainty, it became clear that
no private investor was willing to buy out Louis Rich and assume operations of the West
Liberty plant.
The growers were conscious that there was no alternative to this plant and that they
would have to quit growing turkeys. As a result, a group of 47 growers formed with the
objective of creating a growers’ cooperative that would own and operate the West Liberty
plant.7 Several major problems needed to be solved before the cooperative could be
formalized: the group of growers needed money to buy the plant, they needed expertise to
run the plant, and they also needed customers for the turkey meat.
In November 1996, a management team was formed and hired by the growers. The
newly hired CEO was a specialist of turkey processing and had extensive experience with
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the cooperative setting. During the same time, negotiations with Louis Rich were taking
place.8 By continuing operations and not releasing the plant employees, Louis Rich could
save severance payments worth more than the plant value itself. As a result, Louis Rich
initially committed to purchase no less than 50% of the meat produced by the cooperative
during the rst years of operations. This initial deal solved part of the problem of nding
customers.
The last important problem for the growers was to nd the up-front equity necessary
to purchase the plant. Most of this capital was collected through private loans that were
extended to growers by local banks. This nancial effort was considerable and resulted in
most growers having at least some of their land (or other personal assets) collateralized.
Such loans were especially difcult to obtain for those who had few physical assets to
collateralize.
During the rst years of operations, the cooperative went through three consecutive
recapitalizations. These recapitalizations were triggered by liquidity shortages due to
depressed turkey prices and higher input prices.9 The processing operations were losing
money. In the initial nancial setup, members were asked to add $1 in equity for each
turkey they would deliver. Then, one year later, the board decided to add another $1 per
member for each bird, doubling the initial commitment. Finally, in a third round, the unit
turkey price was lowered by $1.50 for every member. These consecutive demands for cash
caused the exit of several, mostly older, members.10
Two results of these recapitalizations bear remark. First, the members who chose to
stick with the organizations saw much of their wealth transferred from their farms into
cooperative equity. Second, more than one interviewee remarked that successive
recapitalizations acted like a self-selection mechanism in which only the relatively good
growers decided to stay within the cooperative structure.
Although it is hard to quantify the second effect, all of our interviews indicate that the
rst effect explains several institutional features observed in the new organization.11 We
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believe that this particular aspect is one of the main sources of internal efciency of the
cooperative. In particular, it explains the apparent success of the cooperative in
implementing new delivery contracts. The next section describes the main stages of the
design of this new contract and its characteristics.
The cooperative contract: Learning and efficiency
Although, one possible option for the cooperative was to replicate the contractual
terms that Louis Rich had with its growers, it seems that this possibility was never
seriously considered. The growers were conscious that the nancial structure of the
cooperative was equivalent to the growers being residual claimants for the cooperative
output. As argued before, nearly all of them had transferred a substantial portion of their
wealth into cooperative equity. Thus, failure of the cooperative was simply not an option
for most of them.12 As a result, the growers allowed the board to set up a contractual
structure for all growers that closely resembles the contract used by the southeastern
growers, and that is therefore signicantly more arm’s length than the central Iowa
contract used by Louis Rich.
In the current procurement contract, grower-members own the turkeys grown on their
farms, and the unit delivery price is specied in advance. The contract is thus close to a
pure fixed-price contract.13 In this contractual relationship, the cooperative no longer
shares the input costs, as the growers have to purchase all of the input necessary to grow
the turkeys. This contract is a high-powered incentive scheme and it is undoubtedly less
demanding, in term of monitoring and administrative costs, than the agreement that Louis
Rich had with its central Iowa growers. Nevertheless, this contract was seen by some
members as too risky. Ultimately, the cooperative had to introduce some risk-sharing into
the contract and the delivery price is now contingent upon the future price of key inputs
such as corn and soybeans. This removes some of the risk that members would face as
truly independent growers.
The cooperative has spent considerable time budgeting costs in order to arrive at a
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fair price for grower-members. Our interview with the chairman of the board revealed
that growers’ experience was crucial in evaluating growers’ costs. Growers were asked to
organize meetings to study every major component of cost. One interviewee noted how,
during these meetings, they discovered that what was budgeted by Louis Rich for inputs,
such as litter, was much higher than necessary. This anecdote arguably demonstrates how
a private processor had less information of the growers’ costs than the cooperative was
able to obtain. Apparently, this was possible because the members understood that it was
in their interest to reveal their private information about costs.
The new contract was not much of a change for the southeast Iowa members who had
similar contractual terms with Louis Rich prior to the buyout. This is in contrast to the
central Iowa growers who had to adapt themselves to these new contractual conditions.
When asked about the way they perceive their situations now and then, our interviews
with central Iowa growers indicate that they unambiguously perceive it as less
comfortable now. Relatedly, they mention that their work-load increased substantially as
a result of the introduction of the cooperative contract.14
The transition between these two contractual relationships has been rough for some
growers. However, our inquiry does not show that the cooperative has had major problems
with enforcement of the contract. Rather, whenever a member is struggling to honor his
delivery duties, the cooperative always attempts to solve the problem on a one-by-one
basis. For instance, and to the best of our knowledge, no expulsion of a WLF member has
ever occurred. Given the lack of a formal written delivery contract, it appears that the
WLF cooperative relies on a substantial up-front equity requirement to align growers’
interests with those of the cooperative. This fact demonstrates how a strong nancial
contractand in particular the large nancial penalty a grower faces in the event the rm
failscomplements and allows for the smooth functioning of the procurement contract.
Next, we show how members’ nancial interest in the cooperative is also responsible
for other important features of WLF.
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Decision-making and communication in the WLF cooperative
With all its members having a large nancial interest in cooperative success, it is
natural, and our interviews conrm, that there is demand by growers to participate in the
decision-making processes of the cooperative. This demand can be detrimental to the
organization if it does not manage information ows effectively. On the one hand,
members have a right to be informed and to participate in strategic decisions. On the other
hand, it can be difcult to fully respond to every demand for communication and
involvement made by individual growers. Our analysis reveals that the cooperative board
of directors is an essential instrument used to achieve this balance. We rst describe how
the board evolved toward a better management of information.
The role of the board and learning to communicate. In any traditional corporation,
the board represents the interest of the owners of the rm, whereas in a cooperative, the
board represents the interests of both the owners of the rm and of grower-members who
deliver a key production input.
The board of WLF makes several types of decisions. Our interviews revealed at least
two major potential sources of conict among members in these decisions. First, there is
tension between newer members and senior (or initial) members. As argued in the
previous section, the early stages of the cooperative were difcult because there were
successive recapitalizations that were required in response to market crises. Newer
members, on the other hand, have never been exposed to this kind of nancial stress. The
pricing of the turkeys explicitly accounts for this difference with newer members
effectively receiving a lower net price (they earn the same price for their turkeys but get
much smaller unit shares on patronage refunds). This unequal price is cause for conict
when turkey prices are low, and newer members have difculty earning positive margins.
Another source of conict is the distribution of prot within the cooperative. This
tension usually arises between growers of differing cost efciency. Prots are distributed
through two distinct channels. The rst one consists of increasing the price offered to
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members for their turkeys. The second one consists of increasing the level of patronage
refunds obtained by members. Producers who are production efcient will tend to prefer
output-based pricing, while producers who are production inefcient will prefer
dividend-based pricing (which is divorced from output).
The composition of the board at WLF has evolved over time and reects the evolution
and the growth of the organization. When the cooperative was created, the board was
entirely composed of grower-members. As is the case with NGCs, the important decisions
are usually made by the members, and the number of votes a member can carry depends
on the quantity of delivery rights. For instance, in 2005, Stock A provided 1 vote for each
100,000 birds. Recently, the cooperative has created another type of stock (stock B) to
allow outside sources of equity. Stock B does not carry delivery rights but allows persons
such as members’ family or institutions (e.g., local banks) to invest in WLF. Members
who do not want to expand their operations but who do want to invest more in the
cooperative can also hold B stock. This stock carries voting rights. The board is currently
composed of thirteen persons. The CEO is not on the board, though he does attend board
meetings. Usually, decisions are made by the executive committee, which has full board
power and is composed of four persons, with 1 stock B representative.
At the beginning of the cooperative operations, a crucial design task was to allow for
necessary communication between grower-members and management of the processing
operations. Our inquiry suggests that this task was largely accomplished by the rst CEO.
In his interview, he told us that a major part of his time was devoted to communication
with growers, especially at the beginning of the operations. This can be explained partly
by his personality but also by the fact that, at that time, the growers sitting on the board
did not have expertise in processing operations. Over time, however, it seems that the
board has played a more important role in communication with growers, especially after
the rst CEO left in 2004.
A major challenge for the board was to be able to explain concretely to the grower
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base the consequences of the board’s decision for farming operations. As the chairman
puts it, you have to be able to read a nancial statement, and put it in total farmer
language. The chairman commented to us that to accomplish this objective he needed to
be surrounded by expert people on the board, and, as a result, growers who possess useful
expertise are usually suggested as candidates for a board slot. For instance, one of the
growers of the executive committee is a certied public accountant. This aspect underlines
one of the main differences between a private and a cooperative undertaking. A private
processor cares primarily about rm prots; growers matter only to the extent that they
contribute to rm prots. In the cooperative setting, growers are the owners of the
processing plant and as such any decision concerning the processing operations will
reect the interest of growers as investors and as farmers. This additional constraint,
which any cooperative faces, is at the core of arguments by Hansmann (1996), who
documents the importance of heterogeneity in collective decision-making as an additional
cost of cooperative activity. These observations on the WLF cooperative are consistent
with this argument.
Another challenge that the board faced was to restrict communication channels
between individual growers and the management of operations. Initial experience showed
that such direct communications were a nuisance for the whole organization. To solve this
particular problem, the cooperative has now implemented a strict chain of command that
every member has to follow when when he has major complaints about the processing
operations. The major complaints between the members and the operations are now
handled exclusively by the board which then tries to solve the problem with the
management. Thus, there is a denite effort from the board to isolate the operations
from the growers’ complaints, although the chairman conceded to us that members are
still permitted to call the management for minor problems.
Finally, the board needed also to put an end to information leakages. Here again, the
board decided to restrict the communication of marketing information because, as
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emphasized by the chairman, too much was going out. As a result, the amount of
strategic information members have access to is now substantially reduced relative to
earlier years.
It is clear that these successive adaptations have caused regular members to feel less
in control of their cooperative. To mitigate this effect, part of the board meetings are open
to the growers so they can come and ask questions about board decisions. Our general
feeling is that there seems to be some board supervision on the part of the growers. One
grower member revealed to us that he was not going to these meeting as much as he would
like because he did not want to give the board the impression that he was constantly
looking over their shoulders. Such an attitude suggests both a legitimate desire to know
and a trust in the board’s integrity and expertise. This trust is only possible if directors,
who are also growers, have well-aligned interests with the grower base, a condition that,
we think, is largely met in the WLF case.15
Group decision-making and innovation. We highlight here two aspects related to
operations that the board worked on recently: yield optimization and food safety.
The optimization of animal yields in the plant has became a major issue. The board
estimated that saving a thimble-full of breast meat in the cutting operations easily
represents $250,000 in additional prot at the end of the year. As noted by one member of
the board, yields are a combination, and such savings can only be implemented if each
operation is well coordinated. In the most recent growing contract, growers are given
incentives for providing bigger animals, because every turkey involves the same amount
of work, whatever its size. As a result, stronger incentives for bird size have been
introduced in growers’ bonus schemes. Interestingly, those incentives have been passed on
by grower-members to their own employees, who now obtain bonuses when average bird
sizes are larger.
However, having big, homogeneous birds was a necessary condition only for
increasing yields. To be fully effective, these production incentives had to be coordinated
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with efforts in plant operations. Indeed, to capture results from the work of employees and
to achieve a higher efciency, management has started to match employees to the right
job. For instance, as reported by one member of the board, individuals described as knife
happy were systematically removed from tasks involving cutting.
The board was also active on marketing issues. Analysis of trends in turkey meat
demand revealed to the board that the only severe problem that could possibly break the
cooperative would be a recall. Recalls of product are typically triggered by food safety
issues such as lysteria or other germs found in the end product. The board hired sanitation
specialists and designed new slicing rooms. The aim of this task force was to design
entirely independent slicing rooms with meat traceability so that if any recall happened, it
would only affect a tiny portion of the production operation.
The design of these 20 (sanitary) independent slicing rooms turned out to add value to
production. Indeed, WLF can now claim to offer cutting-edge food safety control, and this
is a valuable attribute to customers. Several brands, including Subway and McDonalds,
have already expressed strong interest in such a product. The second example shows to
what extent the board is actively involved in shaping the strategy of the cooperative. We
believe that the strong nancial interest the board members have in WLF’s fate again
explains such an involvement.
Conclusion and further discussion
The case study of WLF possesses several intriguing features. First, our inquiry
contrasts two different organizations of turkey production, one in which a privately owned
processor contracts with growers and one in which turkey production is performed in a
cooperative setting. Second, our description of the contractual relationships between the
growers and the processor reveals that, in the cooperative setting, the monitoring structure
is signicantly reduced. More specically, the farmer retains the ownership of the birds
and organizes the supply of the necessary inputs. This situation is not typical in the
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poultry industry (Leegomonchai and Vukina, 2005).
WLF appears to have been successful in transforming an apparently low-return
enterprise (a private processor chose to exit) into a sustainable cooperative organization.
Although part of this success may be the result of luck and skilled management, it also
seems that grower ownership of the processing facility fundamentally transformed
production incentives at the farm level. Arguably, this transformation is the result of the
large cost each grower would have to bear if the rm failed. However, this risk is costly to
bear, and as growers we interviewed clearly indicated, life in the cooperative is less
comfortable. Growers are working harder and face substantially more risk than when
they were producing for a private processor. In other words, although growers may be
receiving higher net monetary returns (because they are now receiving a share of
processing prots, in addition to a payment for turkey production) it seems that agency
rents or true net returns have likely fallen. This observation is consistent with the work of
Hueth and Marcoul (2005) who argue that these changes can be understood in the context
of a nancial contracting model where asset pledging and the assumption of risk generate
higher work effort by growers and a reduction in agency rents. Of course, if this were the
only implication of organizing production cooperatively, we would expect never to see a
private rm. Thus, there are likely costs from cooperative organization that balance these
benets. Our study is consistent with the view of Hansmann (1996) and others that the
cost of democracyi.e., decision making with heterogeneous preferencesis one
likely source of such cost.
Several questions are left unanswered by our study. For instance, it is difcult to
gauge the level of efciency of this organization of production compared to what is
achieved by integrators in a similar segment of production. If such an organization
achieves a higher surplus then it might replace, in the long run, more traditional
organization of production. However, the feasibility of this type of organization seems
questionable since, as we showed, it involves a signicant level of risk taking on the part
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of growers. Finally, we are silent about the importance of the membership size on the
functioning of such an organization. Intangible assets, such as social capital, have been
shown to be an important determinant of the success of cooperatives. However, high levels
of peer monitoring, which are a part of social capital, are likely feasible only when the
size of the membership is relatively small. These sorts of questions might be addressed in
future work with cross-sectional or panel observation of rm entry and exit decisions, or
possibly by systematic observation of variation in the internal structure of different
organizational structures.
Endnotes
1. This evidence, which we document more carefully below, is based on interviews with key
individuals of the cooperative including the current and former CEO, the chairman and
another member of the current board of directors (both growers), and four additional
grower-members. All interviews lasted between 45 minutes and 2 hours and were tape
recorded and later typed. Each subject was paid $50 for participating in our study.
2. The scope of this credit rationing problem is relatively general and does not only apply
to cooperatives. See Eswaran and Kotwal (1989) or Gintis (1989) for an application in the
context of labor-managed rms.
3. We are not aware of examples of an open cooperative transforming into a close NGC form.
4. The use of collateral was rare, since most of the borrowers were poor and were denied
credit from traditional credit banks.
5. As demonstrated in their paper, the farmer’s incentives to adulterate the milk (e.g., by
adding water) were quite important largely because there was large variance in the quality
of the milk supplied. The authors argued that after the introduction of a new (and cheap)
testing technology, the payments for the milk became tied to quality and eventually
disappeared.
6. This type of contract seems standard in the poultry industry. For instance, see Martinez
(2002) and Leegomonchai and Vukina (2005).
7. There is no evidence that Louis Rich threatened a retreat intending to negotiate a better
contract with growers (e.g., by bargaining for lower turkey prices).
8. Besides the West Liberty plant, the growers also purchased a feed mill in Ellsworth, Iowa
and the Louis Rich Company farms located in Iowa.
9. Our interviews with senior members reveal that these dropping prices and the gloomy
prospect of the cooperative at that time discouraged potential new members and increased
the burden on existing members who had already made large initial commitments.
10. The chairman of the board revealed to us that, in the last round, some members decided to
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borrow against their life insurance as it was their only remaining uncollateralized asset.
Some declined to do so and chose instead to exit, thus losing their delivery right. Later on,
these former members were given the opportunity to buy back their membership under
preferential conditions.
11. We will not attempt to develop and measure the second aspect, partly because it is hard to
come up with an objective measure of good, and partly because we did not interview
members who chose to exit. Differences in risk aversion is another plausible attribute of
growers that might inuence the exit decision.
12. In our interview of the chairman of the board, he recognizes this aspect by saying that the
cooperative is the growers’ money and he concludes, That makes the difference. Your
butt is on the line 24-7.
13. The chairman of the board insisted on saying that there is no contract or that growers are
independent. We concur, in the sense that there is no written contract periodically
signed by both parties. However, growers have delivery duties that are understood by all.
We choose to label this relationship as a contract.
14. The increase in the work-load, compared to the Louis Rich period, is also due to the
increased involvement of growers in the processing and marketing operations. We will
come back to this issue later.
15. Although these sentences appear to be self-serving, the chairman reminded us that he
would not be chairman anymore if he did not have the support of the grower base.
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